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Abstract
We consider a symmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strate-
gic variables. Three players are Players A, B and C. Two strategic vari-
ables are ti and si, i = A;B;C. They are related by invertible functions.
Using the minimax theorem by Sion (1958) and the xed point theorem
by Glicksberg (1952) we will show that Nash equilibria in the following
four states are equivalent.
1. All players, Players A, B and C choose ti; i = A;B;C, (as their
strategic variables).
2. Two players choose tis, and one player chooses si.
3. One player chooses ti, and two players choose sis.
4. All players, Players A, B and C choose si; i = A;B;C.
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1 Introduction
We consider a symmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic vari-
ables. Three players are Players A, B and C. Two strategic variables are ti and
si, i = A;B;C. They are related by invertible functions. Using the minimax
theorem by Sion (1958) and the xed point theorem by Glicksberg (1952) we
will show that Nash equilibria in the following four states are equivalent.
1. All players, Players A, B and C choose ti; i = A;B;C, (as their strategic
variables).
2. Two players choose tis, and one player chooses si.
3. One player chooses ti, and two players choose sis.
4. All players, Players A, B and C choose si; i = A;B;C.
In the next section we present a model of this paper and prove some pre-
liminary results which are variations of Sions minimax theorem. In Section 3
we will show the main results. An example of three-players zero-sum game is a
relative prot maximization game in a three rms oligopoly with di¤erentiated
goods. See Section 4.
2 The model and the minimax theorem
We consider a symmetric three-players zero-sum game with two strategic vari-
ables. Three players are Players A, B and C. Two strategic variables are ti
and si, i = A;B;C. ti is chosen from Ti and si is chosen from Si. Ti and Si
are convex and compact sets in linear topological spaces, respectively, for each
i 2 fA;B;Cg. The relations of the strategic variables are represented by
si = fi(tA; tB ; tC); i = A;B;C;
and
ti = gi(sA; sB ; sC); i = A;B;C:
(fA; fB ; fC) and (gA; gB ; gC) are continuous invertible functions, and so they are
one-to-one and onto functions. When one of the players, for example, Player C
chooses sC , tC is determined according to
tC = gC(fA(tA; tB ; tC); fB(tA; tB ; tC); sC):
We denote this tC by tC(tA; tB ; sC).
When two players, for example, Player B and C choose sB and sC , tB and
tC are determined according to
tB = gB(fA(tA; tB ; tC); sB ; sC)
tC = gC(fA(tA; tB ; tC); sB ; sC):
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We denote these tB and tC by tB(tA; sB ; sC) and tC(tA; sB ; sC).
When all players choose sA, sB and sC , tA, tB and tC are determined ac-
cording to
tA = gA(sA; sB ; sC); tB = gB(sA; sB ; sC); tC = gC(sA; sB ; sC):
Denote these tA, tB and tC by tA(sA; sB ; sC), tB(sA; sB ; sC) and tC(sA; sB ; sC).
The payo¤ function of Player i is ui; i = A;B;C. It is written as
ui(tA; tB ; tC):
We assume
ui for each i 2 fA;B;Cg is continuous on T1  T2  T3. Thus,
it is continuous on S1  S2  S3 through fi; i = A;B;C. It is
quasi-concave on Ti and Si for a strategy of each other player, and
quasi-convex on Tj ; j 6= i and Sj ; j 6= i for each ti and si.
We do not assume di¤erentiability of the payo¤ functions.
Symmetry of the game means that the payo¤ functions of all players are
symmetric and in the payo¤ function of each Player i, Players j and k; j; k 6= i,
are interchangeable. fA, fB and fC are symmetric, and gA, gB and gC are also
symmetric. Since the game is a zero-sum game, the sum of the values of the
payo¤ functions of the players is zero. All Tis are identical, and all Sis are
identical. Denote them by T and S.
Sions minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for
a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear
topological spaces, and let f : X  Y ! R be a function that is continuous
and quasi-concave in the rst variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the
second variable. Then
max
x2X
min
y2Y
f(x; y) = min
y2Y
max
x2X
f(x; y):
We follow the description of Sions theorem in Kindler (2005).
Applying this lemma to the situation of this paper, we have the following
relations.
max
tA2T
min
tB2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC) = min
tB2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC); max
tB2T
min
tA2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC) = min
tA2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC):
max
tA2T
min
tB2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
max
tB2T
min
tA2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)):
3
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)):
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC));
max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)):
max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)):
max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC));
max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tsB ; sC)):
max
tA2T
min
sB2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
sB2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC));
max
sB2S
min
tA2T
uB(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
sB2S
uB(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)):
Also, relations which are symmetric to them hold.
Further we show the following results.
Lemma 2.
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC);
and
max
tC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
tC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC):
Proof. mintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) is the minimum of uC with respect to
tA given tB and sC . Let ~tA(sC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)), and
x the value of tC at
t0C = gC(fA(~tA(sC); tB ; t
0
C); fB(~tA(sC); tB ; t
0
C); sC): (1)
Then, we have
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; t
0
C)  uC(~tA(sC); tB ; t0C) = min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
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where mintA2T uC(tA; tB ; t
0
C) is the minimum of uC with respect to tA given the
value of tC at t0C . We assume that ~tA(sC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uC , ~tA(sC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of t0C can be realized by appropriately choosing sC
given tB according to (1). Therefore,
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC)  max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)): (2)
On the other hand, mintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC) is the minimum of uC with re-
spect to tA given tB and tC . Let ~tA(tC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC), and x
the value of sC at
s0C = fC(~tA(tC); tB ; tC): (3)
Then, we have
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0
C))  uC(~tA(tC); tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s0C)) = min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC);
where mintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0
C)) is the minimum of uC with respect to
tA given the value of sC at s0C . We assume that ~tA(tC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB ; tC)
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uC , ~tA(tC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of s0C can be realized by appropriately choosing tC
given tB according to (3). Therefore,
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)))  max
tC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC): (4)
Combining (2) and (4), we get
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC):
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC given tA and
tB , we have
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC):
Thus,
min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC):
Therefore,
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC);
given tB .
By similar procedures, we can show
max
tC2T
min
tB2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB ; tC);
given tA.
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Lemma 3.
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC);
and
min
tC2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
= max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tB2T
min
tC2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC):
Proof. maxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) is the maximum of uA with respect to
tA given tB and sC . Let ~tA(sC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)), and
x the value of tC at
t0C = gC(fA(~tA(sC); tB ; t
0
C); fB(~tA(sC); tB ; t
0
C); tC(tA; tB ; sC)): (5)
Then, we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; t
0
C)  uA(~tA(sC); tB ; t0C) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
wheremaxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; t
0
C) is the maximum of uA with respect to tA given the
value of tC at t0C . We assume that ~tA(sC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uA, ~tA(sC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of t0C can be realized by appropriately choosing sC
given tB according to (5). Therefore,
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC)  min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)): (6)
On the other hand, maxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC) is the maximum of uA with re-
spect to tA given tB and tC . Let ~tA(tC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC), and x
the value of sC at
s0C = fC(~tA(tC); tB ; tC): (7)
Then, we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0
C))  uA(~tA(sC); tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s0C)) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC);
where maxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0
C)) is the maximum of uA with respect to
tA given the value of sC at s0C . We assume that ~tA(tC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB ; tC)
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uA, ~tA(tC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of s0C can be realized by appropriately choosing tC
given tB according to (7). Therefore,
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC))  min
tC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC): (8)
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Combining (6) and (8), we get
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC):
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC given tA and
tB , we have
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC):
Thus,
max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
tC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC):
Therefore,
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
=max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC);
given tB .
By similar procedures, we can show
min
tC2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC));
= max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = max
tB2T
min
tC2T
uB(tA; tB ; tC);
given tA.
Similarly, we obtain the following results.
Lemma 4.
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC) = max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))
= min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC);
and
max
tC2T
min
tB2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC))
= min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC):
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 5.
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))
= max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC);
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and
min
tC2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC))
= max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = max
tB2T
min
tC2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC):
Proof. See Appendix B.
Also, relations which are symmetric to these lemmas hold.
3 The main results
In this section we present the main results of this paper. First we show
Theorem 1. The equilibrium where all players choose tis is equivalent to the
equilibrium where one player (Player C) chooses sC and two players (Players
A and B) choose tis as their strategic variables.
Proof. 1. Consider a situation (tA; tB ; tC) = (t; t; t). Let
s0(t) = fC(t; t; t):
By symmetry of the game
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t; t) = max
tB2T
uB(t; tB ; t) = max
tC2T
uC(t; t; tC);
and
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t; t) = arg max
tB2T
uB(t; tB ; t) = arg max
tC2T
uC(t; t; tC) 2 T:
Consider the following function.
t! arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t; t):
Since this function is continuous and T is compact, there exists a xed
point. Denote it by t. Then,
t ! arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t):
We have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = uA(t; t; t) = max
tB2T
uB(t
; tB ; t) = uB(t; t; t) = max
tC2T
uC(t
; t; tC) = uC(t; t; t) = 0:
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2. Because the game is zero-sum,
uA(tA; t
; t) + uB(tA; t; t) + uC(tA; t; t) = 0:
By symmetry uB(tA; t; t) = uC(tA; t; t). Thus,
uA(tA; t
; t) + 2uC(tA; t; t) = 0:
This means
uA(tA; t
; t) =  2uC(tA; t; t);
and
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) =  2 min
tA2T
uC(tA; t
; t):
From this we get
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = arg min
tA2T
uC(tA; t
; t) = t:
By symmetry of the game
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = arg min
tC2T
uA(t
; t; tC) = t:
We have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = min
tC2T
uA(t
; t; tC) = uA(t; t; t) = 0:
Then,
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC)  max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = min
tC2T
uA(t
; t; tC)  max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA; t
; tC):
From Lemma 3 we obtain
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; t) = min
tC2T
uA(t
; t; tC) (9)
= max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA; t
; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
sC2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC)) = 0:
3. Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC ,
min
sC2S
uA(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = min
tC2T
uA(t
; t; tC) = uA(t; t; t) = 0:
(10)
Then,
arg min
sC2S
uA(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = s0(t):
(9) and (10) mean
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC)) = min
sC2S
uA(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = 0:
(11)
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And we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC))  uA(t; t; tC(t; t; sC)):
Then,
arg min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC)) = arg min
sC2S
uA(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = s0(t)
Thus, by (11)
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; sC)) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(t; t; s0(t))) = uA(t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))) = 0:
Therefore,
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = t: (12)
By symmetry of the game,
arg max
tB2T
uB(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = t: (13)
On the other hand, because any value of sC is realized by appropriately
choosing tC ,
max
sC2S
uC(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = max
tC2T
uC(t
; t; tC) = uC(t; t; t) = 0:
Therefore,
arg max
sC2S
uC(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = s0(t) = fC(t; t; t): (14)
From (12), (13) and (14), (t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))) is a Nash equilibrium
which is equivalent to (t; t; t).
Now we assume
Assumption 1. At the equilibrium such that tA = tB = t and sC = s0(t),
where tC = t, the responses of uB and uC to a small change in tA have the
same sign.
uA is maximized at tA = t given tB = t and sC = s0(t).
Using this assumption we show the following result.
Theorem 2. The equilibrium where all players choose tis is equivalent to the
equilibrium where one player (Player A) chooses tA and two players (Players B
and C) choose sB and sC .
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Proof. By Theorem 1
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = arg max
tB2T
uB(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = t;
arg max
sC2S
uC(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC)) = s0(t):
Since any value of tB is realized by appropriately choosing sB , we get
max
sB2S
uB(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t)); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = max
tB2T
uB(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = uB(t; t; tC(t; tB ; s0(t)));
and
arg max
sB2S
uB(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t)); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = s0(t): (15)
By symmetry
max
sC2S
uC(t
; tB(t; s0(t); sC); tC(t; s0(t); sC)) = max
sC2S
uC(t
; t; tC(t; t; sC));
and
arg max
sC2S
uC(t
; tB(t; s0(t); sC); tC(t; s0(t); sC)) = s0(t): (16)
Since the game is zero-sum,
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) + uB(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) + uC(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = 0;
and so
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) =  (uB(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))+uC(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))):
Thus,
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) =   min
tA2T
[uB(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) + uC(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))]
= uA(t
; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = 0:
By Assumption 1 since uA(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))  0,
uB(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))  0; uC(tA; t; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))  0;
in any neighborhood of (t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))). Thus, we have
min
tA2T
uB(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = 0; (17a)
arg min
tA2T
uB(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = t; (17b)
min
tA2T
uC(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = 0;
and
arg min
tA2T
uC(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = t:
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By symmetry (17a) and (17b) mean
min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = 0;
arg min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = t:
Thus,
max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t))) = min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = uA(t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))) = 0:
Then,
min
tB2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0(t)))  max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))
= min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t)))  max
tA2T
min
tB2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0(t))):
From Lemma 5, interchanging B and C, we obtain
min
tB2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0(t))) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; t
; tC(tA; t; s0(t)))
(18)
=max
tA2T
min
tB2T
uA(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; s
0(t))) = min
sB2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t)))
= max
tA2T
min
sB2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t))) = min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = 0:
Since any value of tB is realized by appropriately choosing sB ,
min
tB2T
uA(t
; tB ; tC(t; tB ; s0(t))) = min
sB2S
uA(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t))); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = 0:
(19)
Thus,
arg min
sB2S
uA(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t))); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = s0(t):
From (18) and (19)
min
sB2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t))) (20)
= min
sB2S
uA(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t))); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = 0:
And we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t)))  uA(tA; tB(tA; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(tA; s0(t); s0(t))):
Then,
arg min
sB2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t)))
= arg min
sB2S
uA(t
; tB(t; sB ; s0(t))); tC(t; sB ; s0(t))) = s0(t):
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Thus, by (20)
min
sB2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0(t)); tC(tA; sB ; s0(t))) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; s
0(t); s0(t)); tC(tA; s0(t); s0(t)))
=uA(t
; tB(t; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(t; s0(t); s0(t))) = 0:
Therefore,
arg max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; s
0(t); s0(t)); tC(tA; s0(t); s0(t))) = t: (21)
From (15), (16) and (21) (t; tB(t; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(t; s0(t); s0(t))) is a
Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))), and hence it is
equivalent to (t; t; t).
Since any value of tA is realized by appropriately choosing sA, (21) means
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; s
0(t); s0(t)); tC(tA; s0(t); s0(t)))
= max
sA2S
uA(tA(sA; s
0(t); s0(t)); tB(sA; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(sA; s0(t); s0(t)))
= uA(t
; tB(t; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(t; s0(t); s0(t)));
and
max
sA2S
uA(tA(sA; s
0(t); s0(t)); tB(sA; s0(t); s0(t)); tC(sA; s0(t); s0(t))) = s0(t):
Therefore, (tA(s0(t); s0(t); s0(t)); tB(s0(t); s0(t); s0(t)); tC(s0(t); s0(t); s0(t)))
is a Nash equilibrium which is equivalent to (t; t; tC(t; t; s0(t))) and (t; t; t).
Summarizing the results we have shown
Theorem 3. Nash equilibria in the following four states are equivalent.
1. All players, Players A, B and C choose ti; i = A;B;C.
2. Two players choose tis, and one player chooses si.
3. One player chooses ti, and two players choose sis.
4. All players, Players A, B and C choose si; i = A;B;C.
4 Example of an asymmetric three-players zero-
sum game
Consider a relative prot maximization game in an oligopoly with three rms
producing di¤erentiated goods1 . It is an example of three-players zero-sum game
with two strategic variables. The rms are A, B and C. The strategic variables
are the outputs and the prices of the goods of the rms.
We consider the following four cases.
1About relative prot maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura,
Matsushima and Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh
and Tanaka (2014b), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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1. Case 1: All rms determine their outputs.
The inverse demand functions are
pA = a  xA   bxB   bxC ;
pB = a  xB   bxA   bxC ;
and
pC = a  xC   bxA   bxB ;
where 0 < b < 1. pA, pB and pC are the prices of the goods of Firm A, B
and C, and xA, xB and xC are the outputs of them.
2. Case 2: Firms A and B determine their outputs, and Firm C determines
the price of its good.
From the inverse demand functions,
pA = (1  b)a+ b2xB   bxB + b2xA   xA + bpC ;
pB = (1  b)a+ b2xB   xB + b2xA   bxA + bpC ;
and
xC = a  bxB   bxA   pC
are derived.
3. Case 3: Firms B and C determine the prices of their goods, and Firm A
determines its output.
Also, from the above inverse demand functions, we obtain
pA =
(1  b)a+ 2b2xA   bxA   xA + bpC + bpB
1 + b
;
xB =
(1  b)a+ b2xA   bxA + bpC   pB
(1  b)(1 + b) ;
and
xC =
(1  b)a+ b2xA   bxA   pC + bpB
(1  b)(1 + b :
4. Case 4: All rms determine the prices of their goods.
From the inverse demand functions the direct demand functions are de-
rived as follows;
xA =
(1  b)a  (1 + b)pA + b(pA + pC)
(1  b)(1 + 2b) ;
xB =
(1  b)a  (1 + b)pB + b(pB + pC)
(1  b)(1 + 2b) ;
and
xC =
(1  b)a  (1 + b)pC + b(pA + pB)
(1  b)(1 + 2b) :
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The (absolute) prots of the rms are
A = pAxA   cAxA;
B = pBxB   cBxB ;
and
C = pCxC   cCxC :
cA, cB and cC are the constant marginal costs of Firm A, B and C. The relative
prots of the rms are
'A = A  
B + C
2
;
'B = B  
A + C
2
;
and
'C = C  
A + B
2
:
The rms determine the values of their strategic variables to maximize the
relative prots. We see
'A + 'B + 'C = 0;
so the game is zero-sum.
We compare the the equilibrium outputs of Firm B in four cases. Denote
the value of xB in each case by x1B ; x
2
B ; x
3
B and x
4
B . Then, we get
x1B =
(4  b)a+ bcC   bcB   4cB + bcA
(4  b)(2 + b) ;
x2B =
8(2  b)a  3b3cC   b2cC + 4bcC + 7b2cB   16cB + 5b2cA + 4bcA + 3ab3   11ab2
(4  b)(1  b)(2 + b)(4 + 3b) ;
x3B =
8(1 + 2b)a  b3cC + 3b2cC + 4bcC + 4b3cB + 7b2cB   16bcB   16cB + 2b3cA + 9b2cA + 4bcA   5ab3   19ab2
(1  b)(b+ 2)(b+ 4)(5b+ 4) ;
and
x4B =
(4 + b)a+ 2b2cC + bcC + b
2cB   3bcB   4cB + 2b2cA + bcA   5ab2
(1  b)(2 + b)(4 + 5b) :
When cC = cA, they are
x1B =
(4  b)  abcB   4cB + 2bcA
(4  b)(2 + b) ;
x2B =
8(2  b)a+ 7b2cB   16cB   3b3cA + 4b2cA + 8bcA + 3ab3   11ab2
(4  b)(1  b)(2 + b)(4 + 3b) ;
x3B =
8(2 + b)a+ 4b3cB + 7b
2cB   16bcB   16cB + b3cA + 12b2cA + 8bcA   5ab3   19ab2
(1  b)(2 + b)(4 + b)(4 + 5b) ;
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and
x4B =
(4 + b)a+ b2cB   3bcB   4cB + 4b2cA + 2bcA   5ab2
(1  b)(2 + b)(4 + 5b) :
Further when cC = cB = cA, we get
x1B = x
2
B = x
3
B = x
4
B =
a  cA
2 + b
:
We can show the same result for the equilibrium outputs of the other rms.
Thus, in a fully symmetric game the four cases are equivalent.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that a symmetric three-players zero-sum game
with two strategic variables, choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the
Nash equilibrium. We want to extend this result to a general multi-person zero-
sum game. In an asymmetric situation the Nash equilibrium depends on the
choice of strategic variables by players other than two-players case2 .
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Appendices
A Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. mintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) is the minimum of uC with
respect to tA given sB and sC . Let ~tA(sC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)),
and x the value of tC at the value which is derived from the following equations.
t0B = gB(fA(tA(sC); t
0
B ; t
0
C); sB ; sC)
t0C = gC(fA(tA(sC); t
0
B ; t
0
C); sB ; sC):
(22)
Then, we have
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; t
0
C); t
0
C)  uC(~tA(sC); tB(tA; sB ; t0C); t0C) = min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC));
where mintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; t
0
C); t
0
C) is the minimum of uC with respect to
tA given the value of tC at t0C . We assume that ~tA(sC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))
2About two-players case please see Satoh and Tanaka (2017).
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is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uC , ~tA(sC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of t0C can be realized by appropriately choosing sC
given sB according to (22). Therefore,
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC)  max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)):
(23)
On the other hand, mintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC) is the minimum of uC
with respect to tA given sB and tC . Let ~tA(tC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC),
and x the value of sC at the value which is derived from the following equations.
s0A = fA(tA(tC); gB(s
0
A; sB ; s
0
C); tC)
s0C = fC(tA(tC); gB(s
0
A; sB ; s
0
C); tC):
(24)
Then, we have
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0
C); tC((tA; sB ; s
0
C)))  uC(~tA(sC); tB(tA; sB ; s0C); tC(tA; sB ; s0C)) = min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC);
where mintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0
C); tC(tA; sB ; s
0
C)) is the minimum of uC with
respect to tA given the value of sC at s0C . We assume that ~tA(tC) = argmintA2T uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC)
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uC , ~tA(tC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC
given sB according to (24). Therefore,
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))  max
tC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
(25)
Combining (23) and (25), we get
max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = max
tC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC given tA and
sB , we have
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
Thus,
min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
Therefore,
max
tC2T
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC) = max
sC2S
min
tA2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))
= min
tA2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA; tB ; tC(tA; tB ; sC)) = min
tA2T
max
tC2T
uC(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
By similar procedures, we can show
max
tC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC) = max
sC2S
min
tB2T
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC))
= min
tB2T
max
sC2S
uC(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = min
tB2T
max
tC2S
uC(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC):
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B Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. maxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) is the maximum of uA with
respect to tA given sB and sC . Let ~tA(sC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)),
and x the value of tC at the value which is derived from the following equations.
t0B = gB(fA(tA(sC); t
0
B ; t
0
C); sB ; sC)
t0C = gC(fA(tA(sC); t
0
B ; t
0
C); sB ; sC):
(26)
Then, we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; t
0
C); t
0
C)  uA(~tA(sC); tB(tA; sB ; t0C); t0C) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC));
where maxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; t
0
C); t
0
C) is the maximum of uA with respect to
tA given the value of tC at t0C . We assume that ~tA(sC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uA, ~tA(sC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of t0C can be realized by appropriately choosing sC
given sB according to (26). Therefore,
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC)  min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)):
(27)
On the other hand, maxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC) is the maximum of uA
with respect to tA given sB and tC . Let ~tA(tC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC),
and x the value of sC at the value which is derived from the following equations.
s0A = fA(tA(tC); gB(s
0
A; sB ; s
0
C); tC)
s0C = fC(tA(tC); gB(s
0
A; sB ; s
0
C); tC):
(28)
Then, we have
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0
C); tC(tA; sB ; s
0
C))  uA(~tA(sC); tB(tA; sB ; s0C); tC(tA; sB ; s0C)) = max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC);
wheremaxtA2T uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; s
0
C); tC(tA; sB ; s
0
C)) is the maximum of uA with
respect to tA given the value of sC at s0C . We assume that ~tA(tC) = argmaxtA2T uA(tA; sB ; tC)
is single-valued. By the maximum theorem and continuity of uA, ~tA(tC) is con-
tinuous. Then, any value of s0C can be realized by appropriately choosing tC
given sB according to (28). Therefore,
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC))  min
tC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
(29)
Combining (27) and (29), we get
min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = min
tC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
Since any value of sC can be realized by appropriately choosing tC given tA and
sB , we have
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); sC) = min
tC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
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Thus,
max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; sC); tC(tA; sB ; sC)) = max
tA2T
min
tC2S
uA(tA; tB(tA; sB ; tC); tC):
Therefore,
min
tC2T
max
tA2T
uA(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tA2T
uA(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC));
=max
tA2T
min
sC2S
uA(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; sC) = max
tA2T
min
tC2T
uA(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC):
By similar procedures, we can show
min
tC2T
max
tB2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC) = min
sC2S
max
tB2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC));
= max
tB2T
min
sC2S
uB(tA(sA; tB ; sC); tB ; tC(sA; tB ; sC)) = max
tB2T
min
tC2T
uB(tA(sA; tB ; tC); tB ; tC):
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